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Caution must be exercised in promoting the use of biological knowledge for
guidance in legal policy decisions. Scientific information is frequently needed to
heighten rationality, but judges often limit the place of such information; in so
doing, they are not necessarily being parochial. A crucial problem for legal use of
scientific knowledge concerns the boundary between scientific and normative
judgment. In the Durham v. US (1954) decision, Judge Bazelon opened federal
courts in the District of Columbia to fuller participation by psychiatrists in
determining insanity than had been provided by the M'Naghten (1843) rule. Two
decades later, the same court rejected the Durham rule because it led juries to
abdicate judgment concerning defendants' moral responsibility.
The tendency for law to seek significant guidance on normative questions from the
population, rather than from technical experts, is well grounded in our legal
tradition. Even where normative agreement exists, science does not necessarily
contribute to the resolution of normative questions. In a heterogeneous society,
biological knowledge can be of greater use in analyzing the processes by which
normative consensus can be generated through social interaction. Legal thinking has
already begun to examine the ways in which law can affect the norm-generating
process, but much remains to be learned concerning the capacity of human beings to
control conflict, optimize satisfactions, develop standards and satisfy the sense of
justice
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The task of law in reinforcing and helping to create normative order, cannot be
successfully delegated to science. If scientific knowledge is to assume a place in
affecting specific legal decisions and forming specific laws, it must pass close
scrutiny and compete successfully with traditional sources of law. It is more likely to
contribute, I suspect, at the level of general legal principles and processes than in the
direct shaping of specific laws.
Guessing about future interdisciplinary contributions is necessarily a speculative
activity. Whether probable utility can be determined in , advance or must await
evolutionary selection varies with the field in question. It is not clear whether we
know enough at this stage about what biology can offer law to guide future efforts.
The problem might better be approached by asking first about the absorptive
capacities of law. What does law take from other fields and what does it reject?
What internal processes in the development of law bear on the relevance of
biological science to law?
Some light may be cast on these questions by looking at the sources of law in
societies such as ours. To do so, I shall draw unsystematically on some judicial
decisions and jurisprudential ideas. These are intended to illustrate (certainly not to
prove) some selective propensities of our legal system.
(1) Law limits the scope it accords to other disciplines in matters of normative
judgment.
(2) Law seeks instead to rely on moral judgments of the population, where these are
available, to shape legal standards.
(3) Science does not necessarily provide persuasive guidance for or against a law
which accords with the mores.
After illustrating these propositions, I shall suggest that biological contributions to
law might usefully focus on the processes of interaction which generate normative
consensus. Developments in several disciplines indicate that concepts of justice,
possibly inherent in the species, contribute to the formation of norms. In open
societies, which tend toward anomie and normative conflict, there is a particular
need for arrangements which facilitate normative consensus. In the effort to
construct such opportunities, law can greatly benefit from the advice
of all of the human sciences, including sociobiology.
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The capacity of sociobiology to make contributions to specific laws depends not
only on what it has to offer but also on who is listening. There are a number of
discreditable reasons for legal resistance to scientific knowledge, such as ignorance
and professional rigidity. These are often difficult to distinguish from certain more
justifiable bases for legal caution in modifying law to accommodate current
scientific thinking.
I have in mind especially the ambiguity of the borderline between is and ought and
the related question of who should participate in deciding the ought. The record of
inter-disciplinary contributions to legal policy indicates that is- ought problems
frequently arise after initial enthusiasm over the prospective assistance which
science can offer. A familiar pattern has been. repeated in several instances. The
sequence begins with a recognition that some knowledge from another field can be
of great value in resolving legal questions. On this premise, basic legal decisions are
made which rest on the findings of the other field. In applying these basic decisions,
law draws on experts from the other field to provide factual information relevant to
specific cases. As this is done, it turns out that the experts disagree on factual
matters of specific relevance to the decision at hand. Their differences not only
reflect the ambiguity and limitations of scientific knowledge; they also point up the
relevance of normative considerations to the resolution of the issue. When scientists
are brought into a specific case, neither law nor science can reliably draw the line
between fact and value, between is and ought.
A fine example is found in the use of psychiatrists during the past three decades in
the Washington, D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to testify concerning the insanity of
criminal defendants. The history of the insanity defense, so well summarized
elsewhere (e.g. Goldstein, 1967), need not be described in detail here. Suffice it to
say that in the Durham case, Judge Bazelon replaced the traditional M'Naghten rule
with the so-called product test in the hope that psychiatric testimony could be
introduced more freely and could playa larger part in determining whether insanity
would excuse what otherwise would have been a criminal act. M'Naghten had
limited the insanity defense originally to the question of whether the defendant knew
the nature and quality of his act or, if he did, that it was wrong. Durham broadened
this test conceptually to include any instance in which the
act in question was the product of a mental disease or defect.
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The Durham rule appreciably increased the incidence of successful use of the
insanity defense. It led to decisions by jurors which were dominated by the
testimony of psychiatrists. As a result, verdict inconsistency (always present) could
be attributed to the happenstance of forensic testimony and psychiatric attitude.
When St. Elizabeth's psychiatric hospital shifted over the weekend to the view that
psychopathic persons were mentally ill, Friday's finding to guilt became not guilty
on Monday morning (in re Rosenfield, 1957). The major problem seemed to be the
transfer from jury to expert psychiatric witness of the basic normative judgment.
Through a series of successive cases, the Court tried to specify and narrow the rule
so that the jury would have more specific judicial guidance. The purpose of these
developments, sometimes explicitly stated, was to prevent the determination of
blame-worthiness from being dominated by psychiatrists. The psychiatric
profession, concerned primarily with therapy, leans toward a guilt-free conception of
human affairs. It strives to understand all and to forgive all, in order to cure as many
as possible. This conception does not readily fit with the legal approach which, for
purposes of standard setting and enforcement, seeks to fix moral responsibility, i.e.
culpability. Ultimately, the court moved in Brawner 'V. US (1972) toward a revision
of the rule that gave much more explicit criteria to the jury, in the expectation that
they would thereby be enabled to decide the normative issue of responsibility
themselves. Judge Bazelon, in a partial dissent, joined in reversing Durham while
expressing the view that the court should be even more explicit in limiting the role
of the psychiatrist.
II
More is involved in such examples than a simple competition between the
professions. The courts reflect here and in many other areas an inclination to take
into consideration the views of the public. In the example of the insanity defense, the
courts explicitly express the concern that the jury will be deprived of its normative
function. This concern is also manifested by the courts in the traditional deference to
the legislature and in the use of changing community standards in judicial review to
determine constitutionality.
Some court opinions reveal with particular clarity the importance of community
standards. In the first of two major capital punishment cases, Chief Justice Burger
gave this account of the Court's accepted way of construing the Eighth Amendment's
ban against cruel and unusual punishment.
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The Eighth Amendment prohibition cannot fairly be limited to those punishments
thought excessively cruel and barbarous at the time of adoption of the Eighth
Amendment. A punishment is inordinately cruel, in the sense we must deal with it in
these cases, chiefly as perceived .by the society so characterizing it. The standard of
extreme cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral
judgment. The standard itself remains the same, but its applicability must change as
the basic mores of society change (Furman v. Georgia, 1972: 382).
Differences of opinion are found among the judges not as to whether the mores are
important in interpreting the "cruel and unusual" clause, but as to how public
sentiment should be measured. Some would rely on the legislature to reflect public
opinion (except in instances where there existed "unambiguous and compelling
evidence of legislative default" [Furman 'V. GeOrgIa, 1972: 384]). Others would
supplement legislative action with information derived from referenda ! (presumably
a more direct measure) and public opinion polls. For J Justice Marshall, the criterion
to be applied was whether public (opinion, if enlightened by the kind of information
available to the Court, would have favored abolition. And Justice Brennan urged a :
shift from the level of specific norm, existing or potential, to a broader principle.
Capital punishment, he said, is unconstitutional because it does not accord with "the
evolving standards of decency which mark 1~, the progress of a maturing society a
criterion initially enunciated for , the Court by Justice Warren in the earlier Eighth
Amendment case of Trop 'V. Dulles (1958: 101). The standard of decency in this
instance involved the concept of human dignity. Capital punishment, said Brennan,
was unconstitutional because our moral evolution as a society has brought us to the
point of valuing the dignity of each individual human being. In our value system, we
are ready to believe that "even the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed
of common human dignity" (Furman 'V. GeOrgIa, 1972: 273). That being the case
the discard of any human being by execution is for Brennan unconstitutlonally cruel
and unusual.
Each.of these approaches indicates an effort by the judges to shape law of societal
norms. The variations have to do with how the normative position of the society is
best registered, whether it is ; current or potential, whether it is pervasive or limited
to a (particularly significant) segment of the population, and whether it is derived
from and consistent with a general set of values.
In using capital punishment as an example, I have chosen a line of

[20]
LAW, BIOLOGY AND CULTURE
l
decisions in which the courts most explicitly consider public opinion. In other
spheres, this tendency is more obscure or absent. We need to know more about its
distribution in the universe of court cases. It seems to me, though, that recourse to
public opinion (however it may be ascertained) constitutes a systemic tendency
which is particularly marked where societal norms are strongest.
The tendency to seek consistency between the mores of society and the law is an
important characteristic of our legal system. The theory of representative
government, as carefully described by Dahl (1956) and others, rests on the premise
that law and government will receive greatest support in our type of society if the
interests and standards of the population influence the making of the laws. For this
reason, the courts regularly defer in form at least to the legislature by according to
its statutory acts the "presumption of constitutionality. When the Courts declare a
statute to be unconstitutional (as formulated or implemented) they seek justification
under a broader set of values embodied or inherent in the Constitution which are
assume to express deeply anchored, general value commitments of the society
concerning the rights of individuals, social categories, organizations, or
governments.
III
The propensity of law to be guided by public opinion does not mean that the mores
do in fact playa large part in shaping the law. While that relationship may be
fundamental in primitive societies, as suggested by Bohannan ( 1965) in his concept
of double institutionalization, public opinion offers much less guidance in urban
societies because such societies are so normatively heterogeneous. As Dicey (1905)
pointed out concerning England in the late nineteenth century, there may not be a
public opinion on many issues, and if there is it may not be transmitted, or, if
transmitted, not be taken seriously in the shaping of laws. If anything, our situation
shows even greater diversity than did nineteenth century England.
Recourse to science as a basis for normative judgment may reflect the need for some
sort of consensus which is so lacking in our pluralistic, anomic society. But I am
skeptical at the prospect that science can support particular laws or mores in a
sustained and effective manner. It seems to me far more likely that it can contribute
to belief in some general principles and procedures which may eventually influence
mores and laws.
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Science seems poorly fitted to shape laws because laws are so heavily normative in
content. They are expressions, that is, of what people feel to be proper behavior. The
societal sense of what is proper is derived largely from socialization and experience,
rather than from scientific observation. If anything, scientific studies of the range of
human societies demonstrate the enormous diversity in normative beliefs found in
human cultures. “The mores,” Sumner remarked, “can make anything right and
prevent the condemnation of anything." In the face of such diversity, the search for
universals succeeds if at all only at a highly abstract level. We may find that all
societies have some form of family, for example, but we must also acknowledge that
the family can be polygynous, monogamous or polyandrous; that it can be stable
over a lifetime or highly unstable; that it can be rigorously exclusive or co-existent
with extensive philandering; and so forth.
How then might science help to provide guidance to law, for example in the matter
of family structure? It might (1) call for toleration, (2) provide technical (functional)
information or (3) aid in the development of societal norms.
(1) The first possible use of biology is to reinforce the norm of toleration. Given the
diversity of human societies and of primate behavior, scientists might urge that laws
seeking to constrain freedom of behavior should be regularly avoided. Of course
such a position must specify limits. Law must presumably constrain freedom where
freedom is used to harm other individuals or the society. This classic position,
tracing back through J. S. Mill to John Locke, sets terms of inquiry but does not
answer the question. What behavior must be constrained to avoid harm to the
individual and the society?
Law frequently wrestles with such questions. An interesting ex- ample is found in
the instance of polygyny. In the early test of this issue, presented by the Mormon
religion, the Supreme Court upheld the proposition that freedom of religion did not
protect this practice from statutory prohibition even though the practice was deeply
imbedded in a system of religious belief. In doing so, the Court drew r on the
prevailing mores:
Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations of
Europe and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively
a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people. (Reynolds v. US, 1878: 164).
Later the Court condemned polygyny as a "return to barbarism"
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(Church of Jesus Chnst of Latter Day Saints 'V. US, 1890: 49) and a "notorious
example of promiscuity" (Cleveland 'V. US, 1946: 19).
The Court thus expressed the prevailing mores and supported a" legislative policy
which enforced those mores. In order to override the . First Amendment guarantee of
freedom of religion, the Court was bound by its own doctrines to find that the
legislation had a "valid “secular purpose." Such a purpose was found in the effort to
preserve monogamy. The Court affirmed the legitimacy of that purpose primarily by
reasserting the monogamous mores of this society, calling to mind their
pervasiveness in the north-west European cultural area, and ethnocentrically
condemning the alternative family patterns as barbarian and alien.
Could the case be made scientifically that preserving monogamy is not a valid
purpose? All societies have mores of one kind or another The mere fact of
intersocial variations in mores, while true, does not seem to obviate the need for a
particular set of mores in any given society. Survival as a society may well depend
on some degree of normative consensus. Within wide limits, the fact of agreement
may be more important than the content or substance of the agreement. Law may be
seen as one device (perhaps the major device) by which a complex society can
achieve and express necessary normative agreement. Thus, a scientific argument for
a norm of toleration would not necessarily carry the day.
(2) If science is to attack laws which express the mores, it might have a better
chance if it questioned the instrumental effects achieved by particular laws of this
type. The courts are doctrinally prepared for such functional arguments. Secular
purposes, justifying limitations of First Amendment freedoms, are linked to effects.
An expressive purpose may be enough, but the courts are also concerned with "
consequences. If a law produces the opposite of its intended result, it may fail to
meet the test of a rational relationship.
In the polygyny cases, the Court used language of both purpose and effect. Writing
for the Court in Cleveland 'V. US (1946: 19), Justice Douglas not only condemned
polygyny on moral grounds, but also spoke of "the sharp repercussions that
[polygynous practices] have in the community." What repercussions he had in mind,
beyond the moral concern, is not clear.
One possibility worth considering concerns the economic significance of differing
family structures. It is the essence of anthropological functionalism that the
consequences of a particular practice must be understood in terms of the conditions
in which the practice
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occurs. Polygyny, which is functional in an agricultural economy, (especially with a
high female/male ratio), does not retain its economic, social or reproductive
functions in industrial societies. This functional difference between types of
societies is supported not only by correlational observation but also by studies of
economic development. Those societies which undergo rapid modernizatlon tend to
move toward monogamy and those which are monogamous move more rapidly
toward modernization (Goode, 1.963). On that basis, one might propound the
argument that polygyny is dysfunctional for a modernizing or modernized society.
Would that kind of analysis lead the scientist inevitably to support laws against
polygyny? Even at the technical level, for example, what ab out post-industrial
society?
Another value in the polygyny case is the role of religious belief. A functional
analysis produces indeterminate results here as well. Sociobiology may tell us
something about the universality of religious belief, manifested in primate "sunworshipping ceremonies" or in prehistoric hominid burial practices. If every primate
society manifests religious belief, what significance does that carry for polygynous
religion? Does it mean that (1) every society must have a single, unifying religious
belief which should be supported by social and legal controls, or (2) that every
member of society should be free to practice non-intrusive religion together with
like-minded others? Depending on the choice, the religious factor also could weigh
for or against the prohibition of polygyny.
(3) There is a third way in which science might contribute to the resolution of legal
policy questions by aiding in the development of social norms. Scientific efforts
might be best employed if engaged in trying to understand the ways ill which
normative systems develop and work in societies. We know that viable societies
always maintain some minimal degree of normative consensus. Failing to do so, a
society loses its stability, its capacity to maintain the functions which it must
perform to hold together. In such circumstances, societal collapse can lead to
immediate misery and uncertain results as the process of reconstruction begins. In
general, societies strive in various ways to maintain their equilibrium and' avoid
collapse, anarchy or revolution.
Scientific knowledge may affect these outcomes by helping us to understand
minimal conditions of normative order. Contemporary work in the social sciences,
jurisprudence and philosophy has given us
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some interesting leads which suggest that a useful empirical inquiry is possible.
Sociobiology can, I believe, play a valuable role in such work.
IV
All human societies (and many other species) have standards of behavior which
regulate interaction. Social control provides a basis for transmitting and enforcing
these behavioral codes. These standards are in addition reinforced by the reciprocal
rewards or reciprocities which are associated with the interactions. Controls and
reciprocities constitute the mutually reinforcing mechanisms which maintain these
conditions of normative order.
In every human society, these codes are verbally formulated as norms (though not
necessarily as laws) used to guide and evaluate individual behavior. As noted, they
vary widely in content from one, society to another. Yet they seem to have in
common the following characteristics:
(1)
they are generated by and manifested in social interaction;
(2)
they are enforced against those who violate them;
(3)
they lead to reward for those who comply with them;
(4)
they are supported by a substantial segment of the society, directly or
vicariously;
(5)
support for them is enhanced by the belief that they are fair or just.
Even a casual sampling of anthropological literature illustrates each of these. Their
universality can for the present be assumed.
My hunch is that these standards are a product of some intrinsic property of the
human species, quite possibly shared with many other species. These codes may
vary widely, like language, from one society to another. But like language they may
reflect common species characteristics. If so, it is important that we understand the
deep structure of these characteristics.
By putting together the ideas of several students of the concept of justice, we can get
some idea of what might be involved. Piaget (1932) tells us that rules are adopted by
groups of children after they reach a certain age (seven to nine years) and have had a
chance to play together. Prior to that age, they have believed that rules come from
some powerful, inflexible authority (e.g. God, father, the mayor) outside of
themselves by whom they are preserved and enforced. This
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"heteronomous" orientation toward authority gives way as they mature. It is replaced
by an "autonomous" orientation such that the children realize that rules are made by
the group for its convenience and that they may be changed to enhance the
satisfaction of the group.
An element emphasized by Rawls—in potential conflict with Piaget—is that the
rules, once accepted, must be stated in advance of knowing to whom they will
apply, that they cannot be perceived as fair if it is known that they change to suit the
advantage of a single person (Rawls, 1971: 11-17). This accords with Lon Fuller's
idea that warning, stability, and even-handed administration are essential elements
of "the morality that makes law possible."
The idea of standards does not mean equality, however Piaget notes that a big
winner in children's games may be required to return some of his winnings to the
game to keep it going, but that he is never deprived of all gains. Barrington Moore
reflects at length on the (for ~ him) puzzling phenomenon that people accept a very
small share ~ rather than rebelling. His eventual explanation-that they come to
accept the very deprivation as a normatively good thing-he illustrates with a story
from India. When a harijan retainer is invited into the home of a newly equalitarian
Brahmin youth, recently returned from school, the invitation is vigorously but
courteously rejected by the servant with the words, "you may have given up your
religion, young master, but we have not given up ours" (Moore, 1978: 61). While
such standards tend to be fixed (more so perhaps than Piaget suggests) in stable
cultures, they are regularly being given new normative content in open, rapidlychanging societies such as ours. Walster points out that a perception of imbalance
between the value of work contribution and compensation for the work leads to a
tension. This is resolved, her research suggests, in one of two mutually incompatible
ways: by increasing the compensation or by derogating the quality of the work or
worker .
These ideas (and many more like them) indicate the prospect that scholarship will
help us increasingly to understand the social bases of behavioral standards. I believe
that sociobiology can make its most important contribution in this area.
To learn more about norm formation does not imply any particular or immediate
effects on questions of legal policy. In the example of 4 family structure, the
prohibition against polygyny may be so deeply rooted in the structure of our society
that any analysis would simply .i confirm the strength of the taboo and its
inevitability under existing social conditions. Even so, it would be interesting to
learn what might
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be discovered if, for example, advocates and opponents of polygamy (let us include
polyandry as well as polygyny) were able to consider the consequences of
permitting these forms. Why should we not develop procedures for discussing, even
simulating, variations which might have societal value? Such deliberation should be
informed by scientific \ knowledge, not displaced by it.
There are many areas in which the society seems burdened because of difficulties in
discovering latent normative dispositions. Better understanding of such dispositions
is, I believe, desirable not only for the sake of the knowledge itself but also for the
uses to which it could be put. Like any knowledge, it has the potential for misuse.
But a program aimed at facilitating normative consensus by structuring voluntary
interactions and encouraging mutually satisfying resolutions seems to me worth
developing. Can sociobiology help in this by informing those charged with
responsibility for legal procedures how to arrange them more effectively?
Better understanding of norm-forming processes is of great importance for
maintaining minimum conditions of normative order. In open, heterogeneous
societies such as this one, the evidence of anomie (normlessness) is found on every
side. Some of this normative diversity provides valuable liberties for the individual
and variations for the society. When anomie passes a certain limit (which we cannot
yet identify), however, it can destroy mutual trust, confidence, legitimacy and a
willingness to adhere to and support the code of the society.
Open societies particularly need to cultivate congruence between law and the norms
of society. Where these do not match, law tends to be viewed as alien to one's
concerns if not an oppressive instrument imposed in the interest of a dominant class.
But the absence of pervasive norms means that law will often fail to accord with
someone's (if not everyone's) conception of what is right. The remedy for this state
of affairs is not necessarily to be found in a renewed effort to use scientific expertise
to shape and support particular legal decisions. Sociobiology and other sciences of
human behavior may contribute much more effectively and appropriately to legal
policy formation by explaining norm-forming processes. With the help of such
knowledge law may provide the best opportunities for normative coalescence. It can
promote interactions between opposing parties which facilitate dispute resolution
and norm formation. Labor-management relations illustrate that possibility (Fuller,
1971). Law can facilitate the orderly termination of relations where these need to be
maintained. This is illustrated by property
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division and custody arrangements in marital dissolution cases [C; (Mnookin and
Kornhauser, 1979). Law can provide a setting in which latent mores can be
collectively expressed and examined. This is illustrated by the use of aggregate jury
determinations in declaring the death penalty for rape unconstitutional (because
disproportionate, excessIve and random) (Schwartz, 1979: 319-325).
These instances are intended only to illustrate the potentialities for law, by arranging
interaction, to facilitate dispute resolution, mutual satisfaction and norm formation.
Much more remains to be done in this direction. Any knowledge that can be found
in sociobiology concerning how disputes are resolved, reciprocities generated and
norms formed will be welcomed as a contribution, where it is most needed, to the
reconciliation of law and the mores in an open, stable, democratic society.
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